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NOTES
PRESENT STATUS OF THE ADKINS CASE
The first minimum wage statute in the United States was
passed by Massachusetts in 1912.1 A permanent commission
was created with power to establish standard minimum rates
for minors of both sexes and for adult women workers. This
action was to be advisory rather than mandatory, enforcement
relying solely on moral pressure through publication of the
names of those refusing to comply. In 1916, the commission
recommended the addition of a penal sanction to render the
statute more effective, but this motion was rejected by the legislature.
In the next few years about a dozen states and territories
enacted minimum wage laws. These laws were of two main
types, each of which avoided the Massachusetts reliance on more
publicity. In Oregon the commission system was followed,2
which system has the advantage of flexibility in varying the
rates from time to time and from industry to industry, as circumstances demand. In Utah,3 a flat minimum of $1.25 per
day for experienced adult women was prescribed by statute,
and no commission was provided for. The great majority of the
legislating states have preferred the commission system.
The constitutionality of the Oregon law was attacked in
1914. After being sustained by the Oregon Supreme Court in
4
the case of Stett/er v. O'Hara,
it was taken to the United
States Supreme Court, where the case was argued in December,
1914. No opinion was handed down until April, 1917, a delay
which provoked bitter comment. 5 The decision of the Oregon
court was affirmed per curiom by an evenly divided court, Mr.
Justice Brandeis~not sitting.6 All of the statutes had been more
or less in abeyance until the constitutional point should be
1

Acts of 1912, Section 706.
'Stat. 1913, Chap. 62.
'Stat. 1913, Chap. 63.
'69 Ore. 519 (1914).
'See U. S. Mon. Lab. Rev., Vol. III, p. 136.
'243 U. S. 629 (1917).

K. L. J.-6
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settled, most of th.3 commissions confining themselves to gathering information and reconciling employers to the law. Taking
the Stettler case as sufficient warrant, some ten or twelve states
now began active enforcement of the minimum rates. Since
labor was at a premium and the cost of living in violent fluctuation, it was difficult to maintain the proper ratio for some
years, and the commissions were required to act with statesmenlike caution; but by 1920 an adjustment had been reached and
the law was functioning well in several states, notably in California.7 This was the situation existing at the time of the
Adkins decision.8
The famous case of Adkins v. Cldren's Hospital0 arose
under the minimum wage law of the District of Columbia.' 0
This statute created a board to investigate, with hearings for
evidence from all interested parties, what wages would be equal
to the necessary cost of living in each occupation for women
workers in order to maintain their health and protect their
morals. This board was to fix and enforce the standards. The
plaintiff was a female elevator-operator, receiving $35.00 per
month and two meals a day in clean and moral surroundings.
The board declared this too low and ordered an increase, which
was alleged to have compelled the employer to dismiss plaintiff.
Averring that she could get no other work equally attractive,
plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute as unconstitutional. This injunction was granted by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. On appeal this was
affirmed by Mr. Justice Sutherland;" McKenna, Van Devanter,
MeReynolds, and Butler JJ. concurring, and Taft C. J.,
Holmes, and Sanford J. J. dissenting, Brandeis J. not sitting
Since our later discussion is dependent on a correct analysis of
the majority opinion, it is worth while to summarize its reasoning with some care. 12
' Here the exceptionally high minimum of $16.00 per week was
maintained, and the commission was successful in recovering for the
workers large amounts of "back wages."
OMost of the information so far set forth was derived from Armstrong, Insuring the Essentials (1932), pp. 46-58, 90-106.
261 U. S. 525 (1922).
1040 Stat. 960 (1918); 43 U. S. C., Sec. 183.
11261 U. S. 525 (1923).
"For a devastating and thorough criticism of the opinion, see
Powell, "The Judiciallty of Minimum-Wage Legislation" (1924), 37
Har. 14 R. 545.
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The fundamental premise is contained in the statement
that, while there is no such thing as absolute freedom of contract, still freedom is the rule and restraint the exception; legislation is justified only under exceptional circumstances. This
reduces the question of constitutionality to a judicial inquiry
into the existence of exceptional circumstances, on which Mr.
Justice Sutherland at once embarks. First he disposes of a
number of cases which had upheld similar social legislation by
showing that they either did not apply to wages or were justified by a temporary emergency. Then he takes up the contention that the statute is valid because it relates to women, an
oppressed class of workers. His answer to this is the extraordinary non sequitur that since women now have the vote, they no
longer need special protection. Thus the two stock arguments
for the statute are out of the way without finding any exceptional circumstances, and he is free to consider it as an original
economic question. As such, he condemns it on the following
grounds: (1) The standard which the statute prescribes for the
direction of the board, i. e., the cost of living, "is so vague as
to be impossible of practical application with any degree of certainty." (2) It cannot be shown that high wages improve morals. (3) The minimum should not be the cost of living,
because that has nothing to do with the employment or with
the value of the work done. (4) The statute takes account of the
necessities of only one party to the contract. Having exposed
these flaws in the statute, Mr. Justice Suth.erland now points
to the danger that an admission of the power to fix minimum
wages will lead to a fixing of maximum wages for labor and
maximum prices for commodities. These considerations combined lead him to conclude that the statute is an arbitary and
unreasonable deprivation of liberty, hence void under the Fifth
Amendment.
The effect of the Adkins decision was to nullify all state
laws on mimimum wages except, oddly enough, the unsatisfactory advisory type current in Massachusetts. 13 It is interestThe following are some of the cases holding statutes void as applied to women: 269 U. S. 530 (1925), (Arizona law, per curiam);
273 U. S. 657 (1926), (Arizona law, per curiam); 300 Fed. 991 (1924),
(Wisconsin law); 161 Minn. 444, 201 N. W. 629 (1925), (Minnesota
law).
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ing to note that in California a fairly effective enforcement has
continued, though admittedly extralegal. The majority of employers are converted to a belief in the economic soundness of
the law, and voluntarily follow the rates set by the commission.
Most of those unwilling to comply are even more unwilling to
pursue a costly lawsuit, hence they pay the standard rates.
Those wealthy enough to litigate are discreetly avoided by the
commission. 14 However in all other states attempts to enforce
the law were abandoned, and the subject of minimum wage legislation appeared to be a closed issue. Not until 1933 did it
again spring into life.
The first exhibition of this renewed vitality was the passage of the Eberhard-Wald Bill15 in New York, in April, 1933.
This is a long statute, very well drawn, providing an elaborate
administrative system to determine and enforce minimum fair
wages. 16 A description of this machinery being slightly removed from our present inquiry, I shall quote only two of the
most significant passages of the statute. Section 550 [Factual
Background]:
. . . In the absence of any effective minimum fair wage rates
for women and minors, the constant lowering of wages by unscrupulous employers constitutes a serious form of unfair competition
against other employers, reduces the purchasing power of the workers
and threatens the stability of industry. The evils of oppressive, unreasonable, and unfair wages . . . are such as to render imperative the exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of
industry and of the women and minors employed therein and of the
public interest of the community at large in their health and wellbeing and in the prevention of the deterioration of the race."

Section 551-8:
"'A fair wage' shall mean a wage fairly and reasonably commensurate with the value of the service or class of service rendered.
In establishing a minimum fair wage for any service or class of
service, the commissioner and the wage board

.

.

.,

(1) may take

into account all relevant circumstances affecting the value of the
service or class of service rendered, and (2) may be guided by like
considerations as would guide a court in a suit for the reasonable
value of services rendered at the request of an employer without contract as to the amount of the wage to be paid, and (3) may consider
the wages paid in the state for work of like or comparable character
by employers who voluntarily maintain minimum fair wage standards."

This statute was highly praised by President Roosevelt in
"ISee Armstrong, op. cit., supra, note 8, at 152-155.
25L. 1933, c. 584, April 29. Cahill's Consolidated Statutes, 1933
Supp., p. 89.
"For an excellent summary, see helpful note In 42 Yale L. J. 1250
(13s).
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telegram to' the governors of thirteen leading industrial states,
17
I
in which he urged the adoption of similar legislation.
believe a few of these states have adopted the identical
18
statute.
The next step was action by the national government in
thd President's Re-employment Agreement, 19 The Blanket
Codes, and the codes for specific industries. I believe the wage
provisions of the Code for the Wet Primary Battery Industry
may be taken as typical of the specific codes, and since it is
likely to be the subject of the first Supreme Court decision on
the question it is worth quoting.
a

Article IV-Wages:
A. No factory employee engaged in processing and in labor incident thereto, shall be paid at a rate of less than 40c per hour; unless
the rate per hour for the same class of labor on July 15, 1929, was
less than 40c, in which case the rate per hour shall be not less than
the rate per hour paid on July 15, 1929, but in no-event shall the rate
per hour be less than 90% of the highest minimum rate per hour
established In this paragraph; provided further that learners may be
paid not less than 80% of such rate...
"B. No other employee shall be paid at a rate of less than $15.00
per week. . .

It may be well to point out the differences between these
two types of legislation before discussing their joint relation to
the Adkins case. First is the matter of declared aims. I have
quoted the preamble to the New York statute20 and the reader
will have noted that it expresses a coherent and pima face intelligent economical theory. The Codes begin by saying: "To
effectuate the policies of Title I of the N. I. R. A." It will be
I'"May I call your attention to minimum wage law just passed by
Legislature of New York and approved by Governor Lehmann which
declares it against public policy for any employer to pay women and
minors a wage which is 'both less than the fair and reasonable value
of services rendered and less than sufficient to meet the ultimate cost
of living necessary to health.'
"This represents a great forward step (in suppressing what constitutes) a serious form of unfair competition against other employers,
reduces purchasing power of the workers and threatens the stability
of industry. I hope that similar action can be taken by the other
states for protection of the public interests."
To Governors of N. J., Pa., Conn., R. I., Ill., Ind., Ohio, Mich.,
Md., Del., N. C., Ala., and N. H. (April 12, 1933.)
" N. H. and Conn. have done so; R. I. is now in travail. The work
of the Interstate Compact Commission of New England has been
effective in this movement.
"July 27, 1933. (A B C of N. R. A.; Appendix D.)
0Supra.
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recalled from the discussion in the course on Government Control of Business that the economic theories expressed in Title I
of the N. I. R. A. are incoherent and mutually contradictory.
Second, the standards to determine and the administrative machinery to achieve minimum wages in the New York statute are vastly superior to the flat rate prescribed by the Codes.
The latter have no way of varying the rates in different districts or of raising and lowering it with fluctuations in prevailing wage scales and the cost of living. Third, the codes apply
to men as well as to women.
Now let us consider the probable reception of these statutes in the United States Supreme Court, or in other words the
present status of the Adkins case. It is just twelve years
since that opinion was handed down, but that short period has
seen significant changes of many sorts. I will discuss first, as
most pertinent, a doctrinal change in the law. Mr. Justice
Sutherland's major premise was that a restraint on liberty of
contract could be justified only by exceptional circumstances,
and that the burden of proving the existence of such circumstances lay on the party supporting the statute. 21 In the later
case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,22
the defendant challenged the constitutionality of a New Jersey
statute regulating strictly the rates which insurance companies
could pay to their agents in that state. The state courts upheld
the statute, and were affirmed in the United States Supreme
Court in a decision which departs widely from the approach of
the Adkins case. The majority opinion, per Brandeis J. concludes:
"As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitution.
ality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitution-

ality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record
for overthrowing the statute. It does not apper upon the face of the
statute or from any facts of which the court must take judicial notice,
that in New Jersey evils did not exist in the business of fire insurance
for which this statutory provision was an appropriate remedy. The
action of the legislature and of the highest court of the state indicates that such evils did exist. The record Is barren of any allegation
of fact tending to show unreasonableness."

Since a good case can be made out for most statutes sustained
by the state courts, and particularly for those aiming to remedy
S u.
pra.

282 U. S. 251 (1931).
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social conditions, this alteration in the burden of proof will be
decisive in the majority of instances. The basic premise of the
Adkins case is seriously impaired. The vigorous joint opinion
in dissent by Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler JJ. shows their appreciation of the bold change of front by
the majority,23 and their disapproval.
The second pertinent change in conditions since 1923 is the
current economic depression. This has had the interesting effectu
of altering the theories of minimum wage legislation. Whereas
in earlier days the declared purpose of such statutes was the
protection of the health and morals of woman workers, it is
now the promotion of national economic recovery. The preamble to the Eberhard-Wald Bill 24 speaks of -unfair competition,
reduction of purchasing power, and threatened stability of industry; it subordinates the matter of health and omits all reference to morals. The N. I. R. A. is primarily an economic measure. This is significant because it means that minimum wage
laws are no longer class legislation; it cannot be said that the
interests of only one party to the contract are considered, and
it is no longer relevant to object that higher wages cannot be
25
shown to improve morals.
Will the Adkins case be overruled? After the O'Gorman
decision removed its legal basis and the depression added economic importance to its ancient social advantages, one might
have thought that the reasons for the holding had been lost and
that the case might be allowed to follow them. But in such a
speculation the personality of the court must be reckoned as a
vital factor. It is here that we find a third significant change
since 1923. Mr. Justice Sutherland and three of those who concurred with him in the Adkins decision remain on the bench.
0Hegemann Farm Corp. v. Baldwin, et aL., - U. S. -, 79 L. Ed.
29, decided Nov. 5, 1934, seems as severe as the O'Gorman case on
parties objecting to statutes on grounds of due process; it is surprising
to note that it was a unanimous opinion. Borden' Farm Products Co.
v. Baldwin, - U. S. -, 179 L. D. 130, decided Dec. 3, 1934, appears
to weaken the force of the presumption of constitutionality somewhat
and may thus modify the O'Gorman doctrine, but is still far from a
reversion to the Adkins position. The importance of the case is diffcult to assess, partly because its disposition was not final, partly because it is one of a group of cases concerning the New York Milk
Control Board and will thus be influenced by other decisions. It was
also a unanimous decision.
SSupra.

21Cf. supra.
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it is often suggested that that case was decided by their convictions in respect to laissez faire, and that it would. be futile to
point out.subsequent developments because their convictions are
unaltered, witness the Nebbia case. 26 I myself incline to this
view,. but their failure to dissent in the Hegemann and Borden
cases 2 7 may warrant "all the noble substance of a doubt." In
any. event, they no longer hold the balance of power. The
deciding votes are now those of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes and
Mr. Justice Roberts, since there is no doubt about the sentiments
of Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo. Mr. Hughes and Mr.
Roberts have indicated in a number of cases2 8 their willingness
to sustain state or federal statutes challenged on grounds of due
process. Had they been on the court in 1923, it is highly improbable that they would have concurred in the Adkins decision.
Since they participated in the revision of attitude embodied
in the O'Gorman case and have shown a good deal of sympathy for governmental recovery measures, it seems even
more probable that they will now refuse to follow the Adkins
doctrine. But I am instructed that Mr. Hughes is extremely
reluctant to overrule a case expressly, especially when such
action would result, as it almost certainly would here, in a five
to four decision. Therefore, in order to placate the minority
and to save the face of the court, it is my prediction that the
Adkins case will be distinguished rather than directly overruled.
In distinguishing the Adkins case, the differences between
the Eberhard-Wald Bill of New York and the N. R. A. Codes
become important. Mr. Justice Sutherland objected to the District of Columbia statute because it fixed the cost of living as
the standard instead of the value of the services, and because
this standard was too vague to be applied with accuracy. He
said further, on page 559:
"A statute requiring an employer to pay in money, to pay at
regular and stated intervals, to pay the value of the services rendered,
even to pay with fair relation to the extent of the benefit obtained
from the service, would be understandable."

The New York statute was carefully drawn to avoid these objecNebbia v. N. Y., 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
2'Hupra, note 23.
iNebbia v. N. Y., supra, note 26; Home Loan & Bldg. Assn. v.
Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934); The Gold Cases, 79 L. Ed. 417-456
(Feb. 18, 1935).
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tions.20 The standard is clearly stated to be the value of the
services rendered, and no reference is made to the cost of living.
Then the commission is given three distinct criteria for the accurate application of this standard. It may take into account
'all relevant circumstances" affecting the value of the service,
which must mean benefit to the employer and general ability of
the industry to pay. It may be guided by the considerations
which would guide a court in a suit for quantum meruit, which
the Supreme Court can hardly condemn for uncertainty.
Finally, it may consider the wages paid in the state for similar
work. The average of these three methods must be conceded to
be a just figure.
But consider the average Code. Usually there is no statement of standards, whether the wage is to be the cost of living,
the value of the services, or some third quantity. Nor is there
any commission to vary the rate in different districts. There is
only a fiat declaration that the minimum wage shall be 40c per
hour. You can distinguish this from the Adkins case only by
saying that the statute is much worse; it is better to have an
objectionable standard than no standard at all, especially when
there is no administrative body with discretion over the actual
application. The added fact that the Codes apply to men as
well as to women, thus introducing a new and highly controversial element, 30 makes the case for them very weak. One can
only praise the wisdom of the framers of the New York statute
in presenting the matter so discreetly.
Although the foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion
that the Eberhard-Wald Bill will be sustained and that the minimum wage provisions of the Codes will be invalidated, the cases
to date do not bear out the latter proposition. Three cases in
the lower courts have not only accepted the validity of the Code
provisions, but have extended them to allow the employee a civil
action to recover the difference between the wages paid him and
the prescribed minimum. 3 1 These cases are unimportant as
See supra.
**There is a strong sentiment against such laws for men within
the ranks of organized labor itself. Armstrong, op. cit., supra, note 8,
at p. 64.
Cs
anton v. The Palms, Inc., 273 N. Y. S. 239, 162 Misc. 347
(July 17, 1934); Lane v. Smith, Mun. Ct., Marion Co., Ind., No. 51647
(June 6, 1934); Laney v. Milner Hotel Co., J. P. Ct., Grand Rapids,
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authority, being all in municipal courts, but show a surprising
liberality in the judges. The only really significant case is
United States v. Perkins,32 now reported to be pending in the
Supreme Court. This is a criminal action for paying less than
the minimum wage under the Wet Primary Battery Code, hut
since defendant pleaded guilty, no legal issues were passed
upon. Until its final adjudication by the Supreme Court we are
limited to speculation, but I think it unfortunate that a case
under the New York statute could not be the first to reach that
body, as better calculated to work the destruction of the Adkins
ease.
NORMAN fACAE, JR.,
243 Muirfield Road, Los Angeles, Calif.

Mich. (March, 1934). See Abramovitz v. Trolman, 273 N. Y. S. 243,
152 Misc. 764 (July 5, 1934); Geo. Washington L. R., Nov. 1934, p. 1,
"Employee's Right to Sue for N. R. A. Codes Wages."
32D. C. (E. D. Pa.), Dec. 7, 1934. U. S. Law Week, Jan. 29, 1935,

p4.

